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2 
Introduction  
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a landmark achievement in 
multilateral disarmament efforts. Its central tenet is that nuclear weapons are unacceptable 
in any hands. dŚĞ dƌĞĂƚǇ ?s supporters among States, the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, and civil society believe that establishing a clear nuclear weapons prohibition 
regime will contribute to renewed progress on nuclear arms reductions towards eventual 
elimination. For their part, the nine nuclear-armed States and most of their allies boycotted 
the negotiations. Thus there are significant challenges to consider as efforts commence to 
bring the fledgling regime into force internationally, and for its eventual implementation. 
 
Context 
In December 2016, the United Nations 'ĞŶĞƌĂůƐƐĞŵďůǇĂĚŽƉƚĞĚĂƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽŶ “ƚĂŬŝŶŐ
ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂů ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ĚŝƐĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?. 1  The resolution mandated the 
convening of a United Nations Conference in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding instrument 
to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. The Conference met at 
United Nations headquarters in New York for two 2017 negotiating sessions, from 27 to 
31 March, and from 15 June to 7 July. Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez of Costa Rica was 
elected as President for both negotiating sessions.  
The Conference was ƚŽ “ŵĂŬĞŝƚƐďĞƐƚĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƐƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚĞŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
ŝƐĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚďǇĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?, according to its provisional rules of procedure.2 On the final 
day however, one delegation (the Netherlands) called for a vote on the treaty text.3 The vote 
was passed by 122 to 1 against (the Netherlands), with one abstention (Singapore). Thus the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons4 was adopted. The TPNW will be open for 
signature on 20 September 2017 during the seventy-second session of the General 
Assembly. 
The origins of the TPNW lie in the Final Document of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
Review Conference, which noted the deep concern of all States Parties with  “the 
catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons ?.5 Prompted by 
this, Norway hosted an international conference in its capital, Oslo, in March 2013 to explore 
these humanitarian consequences. Further international conferences followed in Nayarit, 
Mexico (February 2014), and Vienna, Austria (December 2014), which drew further 
attention to the subject. Widely attended by non-nuclear weapon States, civil society, and 
                                                        
1  General Assembly, Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, A/RES/71/258, 
23 December 2016. 
2  General Assembly, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the United Nations Conference to Negotiate a 
Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards Their Total Elimination, 
A/CONF.229/2017/L.1, 7 March 2017. 
3  General Assembly, Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, A/CONF.229/2017/L.3/Rev.1, 
6 July 2017. 
4  General Assembly, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, A/CONF.229/2017/8, 7 July 2017. 
5  Final Document Volume I, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), p. 12. 
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inter-governmental organizations, this sequence of two-day humanitarian conferences was 
sparsely attended by the nuclear weapon-possessors.6  
Complementing the three conferences, between 2011 and 2014 a succession of joint 
statements underlined concern about the risk of serious humanitarian consequences from 
nuclear weapon use. They also highlighted challenges those weapons pose under 
international humanitarian law. Notably, a humanitarian joint statement initiative with 34 
State signatories in the October 2012 General Assembly First Committee ballooned to 80 at 
the April WMay 2013 NPT preparatory meeting, 125 at the 2013 First Committee six months 
later, and 155 in October 2014.7 Collectively, statements such as these ? along with the 
humanitarian conferences ?ďĞĐĂŵĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ “ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?
Descriptions and evidence of the humanitarian hazards posed by the use of nuclear weapons 
served to sharpen the question of how best to make progress towards nuclear disarmament. 
The emergence after the Vienna conference of a widely subscribed pledge  “to identify and 
pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear 
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶĚ ?ƚŽĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞǁŝƚŚĂůůƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚŝƐŐŽĂů ?8 was a thinly veiled 
call for a process towards a legally binding international nuclear weapons prohibition 
treaty ? the clear ambition of a number of civil society groups, notably the International 
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). The five NPT nuclear-weapon States and 
many of their allies opposed the call for negotiations, however, on the basis that in their 
view it was premature and inappropriate in a global security environment that warrants a 
more gradual  “step-by-step ? approach. This would entail, as initial steps, bringing the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and negotiating a ban on fissile 
material production ? efforts, that have, however, languished since the 1990s. 
This divergence of approach pervaded the failed 2015 NPT Review Conference and the 
debate in the First Committee in October that year, especially on a resolution to establish 
an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) for the purpose of taking nuclear disarmament 
forward. The OEWG meeting duly took place in 2016 without the participation of the nuclear 
weapon-possessors. After a vote 9  it adopted a report recommending that the General 
Assembly ĐŽŶǀĞŶĞ  “a conference in 2017, open to all States, with the participation and 
contribution of international organizations and civil society, to negotiate a legally binding 
instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination ? ?10 This set 
ƚŚĞ ƐĐĞŶĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ƐƐĞŵďůǇ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ  ?ŶŽƚĞĚ ĞĂƌůŝĞƌ ? ƚŽ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶ
                                                        
6  There ĂƌĞŶŝŶĞƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŽƌƐ PŚŝŶĂ ?&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨ<ŽƌĞĂ ?/ŶĚŝĂ ?/ƐƌĂĞů ?
Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. India and Pakistan 
attended all three meetings while the United Kingdom and the United States participated in the 
Vienna conference. 
7  ^ĞĞŽǆ ?ŝŶE ?ZŝƚĐŚŝĞ ? “dŚĞ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞŝŶ ? ? ? ?/>W/ WUNIDIR NPT Review Conference 
Series no.  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ?http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-humanitarian-initiative-in-
2015-en-626.pdf. 
8  Note Verbale Dated 25 August 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Austria Addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament Transmitting Text of the Humanitarian Pledge 
Supported by 114 Members of the United Nations, CD/2039, 28 August 2015. 
9  68 in favour, 22 against, and 19 abstentions. See General Assembly, Taking Forward Multilateral 
Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, A/71/371, 1 September 2016, para. 71. 
10  Ibid, para. 67. 
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negotiations. In March 2017, these commenced with a one-week session that offered an 
initial airing of views and identification of the potential components of a first treaty draft. 
The JuneʹJuly session  
On the strength of views expressed by delegations at the March session and subsequent 
consultations, in May the President circulated an initial draft treaty text as the basis for the 
resumption of negotiations on 15 June. 11  At the outset of the June WJuly session she 
presented each article, provided explanatory remarks, and solicited comments from 
delegations. While States at times offered proposals and suggested language, the President 
retained control of the text, citing her preference for an interactive exchange of views rather 
than a drafting exercise. 
The reading of the draft treaty was structured into several clusters, with the most 
challenging being initially:  
1) the preamble (stating the object and purpose of the treaty); 
2) general prohibitions in article 1, particularly issues of threat of use, testing, and 
transit; 
3) accession and dismantlement processes outlined in articles 2 W5 for nuclear weapon-
possessors; and 
4) victim assistance, environmental rehabilitation, and the question of user 
responsibility. 
On the basis of the ensuing debate and informal consultations, the President circulated a 
revised preamble on 20 June, then a second draft of the full treaty on 27 June. Noting 
technical questions on articles 2 W5 arising in the course of her consultations, the President 
indicated that the revised language was left intentionally simple, and would require further 
work. Article 4 contained the most significant changes, allowing for early joining of the treaty 
by nuclear weapon-possessors, but under specific conditions. 
Overall responses to the WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ? ?:ƵŶĞ text from delegations were positive, although 
some concerns on prohibitions and articles 2 W5 remained. Negotiations then intensified by 
means of informal consultations on article 1 (facilitated by the President), articles 2 W5 
(facilitated by Ireland), articles 6 W8 on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and 
international cooperation (facilitated by Chile), and articles 9 W21 on ƚŚĞ ƚƌĞĂƚǇ ?Ɛ
organizational aspects (facilitated by Thailand). On 29 June, the President noted in a 
negotiation plenary meeting ƚŚĂƚ “ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ?ŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚŝŶĂůů
working groups. Smaller delegations, however, expressed concerns about ensuring that 
their views were being represented because the informal consultations were occurring in 
paallel. 
Each of the facilitators then submitted revised texts from their informal consultations.  Along 
with suggestions gathered from her other contacts, the President incorporated these 
proposals into a third draft she circulated late in the afternoon on 3 July. This was done 
cognizant of the ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƚŝŐŚƚ ƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞ ? Time was needed for translation, and for 
                                                        
11  General Assembly, Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, A/CONF.229/2017/CRP.1, 
22 May 2017. 
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delegations to receive feedback and instructions from their capitals. Nevertheless, the 
desire to conclude and adopt a treaty by the scheduled end of the negotiating round on 
7 July was widely expressed. Plenaries in the last days of the Conference allowed States to 
place their positions on the final text on record. A persistent point of contention was the 
right of withdrawal from the treaty (at 12-months' notice in the text, revised from three 
months; others wanted the right removed).  
Ultimately, the final text was passed to the translators with only slight grammatical 
adjustments (a revised third draft). On 7 July 2017, after the adoption of the TPNW, a 
number of delegations intervened ? some States to offer explanations of vote; most to hail 
the achievement of the treaty.12 
Next steps after the ban 
The negotiation of the TPNW is a significant achievement. It sets forth a broad suite of norms 
that build upon the NPT, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and  “humanitarian disarmament ?
instruments. These norms have now been codified in a legal instrument under the auspices 
and authority of the United Nations. Moving forward, tŚĞƚƌĞĂƚǇ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐĨĂĐĞĂŶƵŵďĞƌ
of challenges in translating these norms into political effects that are consistent with the 
treaty.  
1. Entry into force and the authority of the treaty 
As with any legally binding agreement, the normative effect of the TPNW will depend in part 
on the number of its States Parties. Universalization efforts are thus an important priority. 
Figure 1 provides comparative information on the rate of entry into force of other 
disarmament conventions, and on their progress towards the universal adherence of all 
States in the aftermath of their entry into force. 
The legitimacy of the TPNW ?ƐŶŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ value of the treaty as an effective measure for 
nuclear disarmament will need cementing through the translation of the 122  “yes ? votes in 
favour of the treaty into signatories and ratifications up to ? and far beyond ? the 50 States 
required for entry into force. Only then will the TPNW begin to take on wider  “authority ?in 
global nuclear politics. This will require sustained and mindful attention from ƚŚĞdWEt ?Ɛ
supporters. At the same time, the entry into force processes of other humanitarian-inspired 
disarmament treaties have indicated that having such specific targets and milestones is 
helpful to focusing such efforts. Civil society organizations, regional inter-governmental 
organizations, and sources of established moral authority, such as the United Nations, Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and religious institutions, have important roles to play 
in this process.  
 
 
  
                                                        
12  See https://www.un.org/disarmament/ptnw/index.html. 
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Figure 1. Towards Entry into Force and Universalization 
 
Numbers indicate threshold reached for entry into force. The current tallies of States Parties are as follows: Biological 
Weapons ConventionͶ178, Chemical Weapons ConventionͶ192, Anti-Personnel Landmines ConventionͶ162, 
Convention on Cluster MunitionsͶ102. 
 
 
2. Engagement with nuclear-armed and nuclear weapon-dependent States 
The TPNW ?ƐŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇwill not automatically affect the behaviour of the  “hold-
outs ?  ?primarily the nuclear-armed and nuclear weapon-dependent States). Instead, the 
dWEt ?Ɛ supporters will need to engage with: 
1) members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other nuclear 
weapon-dependent States to work through the implications and practicalities of 
joining the TPNW, in order to encourage and facilitate their accession; and  
2) nuclear-armed States on interim measures that reduce the risk of use of nuclear 
weapons and facilitate the re-engagement of these States with nuclear 
disarmament processes, for example in encouraging them to remove their weapons 
from alert status, embark on further nuclear arms reductions, and develop 
disarmament verification practices. 
Many of the hold-out States reject the TPNW and the legitimacy of the process by which it 
was negotiated, evidenced by stringent rebuttal of the treaty by the United States, United 
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Kingdom, and France.13 Yet, it is essential in this process that nuclear-armed States are 
engaged on an equal basis. EƋƵĂůŝƚǇŝƐĂĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶƚƌĞĂƚǇ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵ
to legitimacy and what differentiates it from the NPT. To date, the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, and NATO have been the targets of most efforts at engagement (and 
criticism) by supporters of a nuclear ban treaty. However, non-NATO nuclear-armed States 
also sustain practices of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons complexes. These and 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ  “ŶŽƌŵĂůŝǌĞ ? ŶƵĐůĞĂr weapons ? including through rhetoric ? will 
warrant re-evaluation.  
3. Configuring the relationship between the NPT and TPNW 
Critics of the TPNW have argued that it undermines the NPT, which sits at the heart of the 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.14 dŚĞEWd ?Ɛ 2015 Review Conference 
ended without a consensus final document (ostensibly over Middle East-related issues). 
Failure to agree on a final document in 2020 will likely be seen widely as a serious breakdown 
of the NPT regime. 
What matters next is how ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĞ dWEt ?Ɛsupporters and detractors engage with the 
current NPT review cycle and the next NPT Review Conference in 2020. States that support 
and join the TPNW will have choices to make in how they interpret the relationship between 
the TPNW and the NPT. Those understandings will affect their statements, actions, and 
negotiating strategies in 2020. This is important, as a key claim that some States supportive 
of a nuclear ban treaty have made is that it will strengthen the NPT.  
Of course, many of the non-nuclear armed States have expressed deep frustration at what 
they see as nuclear weapon SƚĂƚĞƐ ? failure to move to implement their NPT article VI 
obligations. Some TPNW supporters might see the new treaty as an authoritative 
manifestation of disillusionment with the NPT and as a potential alternative to it. They might 
interpret the achievement of the TPNW as legitimizing the politics of division within the NPT 
and disengagement from its processes, though not necessarily to the point of formal 
withdrawal. Nuclear-armed and nuclear weapon-dependent States, however, will likely 
frame the TPNW as a cause of division in the NPT rather than a symptom of long-standing 
frustrations with it.15 
                                                        
13  hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐDŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? “:ŽŝŶƚWƌĞƐƐ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ 
Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom and France Following the 
ĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂdƌĞĂƚǇĂŶŶŝŶŐEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐ ? ?EĞǁzŽƌŬ ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
14  ^ĞĞ' ?WĞƌŬŽǀŝĐŚ ? “dŚĞEƵĐůĞĂƌĂŶdƌĞĂƚǇ PtŚĂƚtŽƵůĚ&ŽůůŽǁ ? ? ?ĂƌŶĞŐŝĞŶĚŽǁŵĞŶƚ for 
International Peace, 31 May 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/31/nuclear-ban-treaty-
what-would-follow-pub-70136; A. Mount and R. Nephew ? “EƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶ^ŚŽƵůĚ&ŝƌƐƚŽEŽ
,ĂƌŵƚŽƚŚĞEWd ? ?ƵůůĞƚŝŶŽĨƚŚĞƚŽŵŝĐ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-
weapons-ban-should-first-do-no-harm-npt10599; ĂŶĚW ?/ǌĞǁŝĐǌ ? “dŚĞEƵĐůĞĂƌĂŶdƌĞĂƚǇĂŶĚŝƚƐ
WŽƐƐŝďůĞZĂŵŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?//^^sŽŝĐĞƐ ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss 
voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2016-9143/november-27c6/the-nuclear-ban-treaty-and-its-possible-
ramifications-36fc. For a comprehensive response, see K. Egeland, T. Graff Hugo, M. Løvold, and G. 
EǇƐƚƵĞŶ ? “ĂŶŽŶEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞEWd PŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇ ?WŽůĂƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ĞĂƌŽĨDĂƐƐ
tŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ? ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>ĂǁĂŶĚWolicy Institute, March 2017. 
15  ^ĞĞW ?DĞǇĞƌĂŶĚE ?ZŝƚĐŚŝĞ ? “dŚĞEWdĂŶĚƚŚĞWƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶEĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ P^ĐŽƉĞĨŽƌƌŝĚŐĞ-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ?
UNIDIR, 2017, http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-npt-and-the-prohibition-negotiation-en-
682.pdf. 
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Alternatively, TPNW supporter States might engage fully with the NPT and nuclear-armed 
and nuclear weapon-dependent States to further develop implementation of its provisions 
on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, non-proliferation, and nuclear disarmament including, 
but not limited to, accession to the TPNW. How the TPNW ?Ɛ supporters choose to engage 
with the NPT over the current review cycle will set the long-term framing of the relationship 
between the TPNW and the NPT. A very strong case can be made that TPNW supporters 
should remain fully engaged with the NPT, not least to strengthen and implement its 
provisions in articles I WVI. 
4. The TPNW and IAEA safeguards 
dWEt ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ dWEt ?Ɛ ƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐ
requirements and state-of-the-art safeguards practices and legal instruments.16 The TPNW 
requires States that have yet to negotiate a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA)17 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to do so, and for all other States to 
maintain at a minimum their IAEA safeguards obligations in force at the time of the dWEt ?Ɛ 
entry into force without prejudice to any future additional safeguards instruments they 
might adopt. For some States this will mean a CSA and IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) 
agreement; for others just a CSA.  
A number of States and many experts wanted the AP to be a specific requirement for States 
Parties to the prohibition treaty.18 The consensus in the 2010 NPT Review Conference final 
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ^ ĂŶĚ W ǁĂƐ  “ƚŚĞ ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ǀĞƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂůů States that have not yet done so should be encouraged to negotiate 
an AP with the IAEA.19 The TPNW has been criticized for allegedly undermining progress on 
safeguards by limiting the basic requirement to the 1972 CSA standard. Irrespective of the 
validity of such criticism, a strong case can be made that States Parties to the TPNW should 
reiterate the NPT position agreed in 2010 and encourage those without an AP to bring one 
into force as soon as possible. 
5. The scope of victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international 
cooperation and assistance 
Articles 6(1) and 6(2) of the TPNW place the primary responsibility for victim assistance and 
environmental remediation on affected States, though States Parties will need to elaborate 
the form of support to their own populations and territory. Concern had been raised during 
the TPNW negotiations that these provisions needed to reflect norms established in other 
humanitarian disarmament instruments. States will need to make decisions on the extent 
                                                        
16  : ?tŽĨƐƚŚĂů ? “^ĞĐŽŶĚdŝŵĞŝƐEKdĂŚĂƌŵĨŽƌƚŚĞEƵĐůĞĂƌĂŶdƌĞĂƚǇ ? ?ƌŵƐŽŶƚƌŽůtŽŶŬ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ
2017, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1203455/second-time-is-not-a-charm-for-the-
nuclear-ban-treaty/. 
17  See INFCIRC/153 (corrected). 
18  : ?ŽƌƌŝĞĞƚĂů ? ? “WƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŽĨEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐ P'ƵŝĚĞƚŽƚŚĞ/ƐƐƵĞƐ ? ?/>W/ WUNIDIR, February 2016, 
p. 37, http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/a-prohibition-on-nuclear-weapons-a-guide-to-the-
issues-en-647.pdf ?d ?ĂƵŐŚůĞǇĂŶĚ' ?DƵŬŚĂƚǌŚĂŶŽǀĂ “EĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐWƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶ
dƌĞĂƚǇ PEƵƚƐĂŶĚŽůƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂŶ ? ?hE//Z ? ? ? ? ? ?http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/nuts-
and-bolts-en-684.pdf. 
19  See Final Document Volume I, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), p. 4. 
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to which they formalize victim assistance and environmental remediation obligations in line 
with existing treaties.20 
Decisions on the form of support also pertain to the provisions on international cooperation 
and assistance. Articles 7(3) and (4) of the TPNW stipulate that each State Party will provide 
technical, material, and financial assistance to States Parties affected by nuclear weapons 
use or testing and assistance for the victims, if they are in a position do so.21 Article 7(6) 
specifies a responsibility for State Parties that have used or tested nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices to provide adequate assistance to affected States for victim 
assistance and environmental remediation. Further elaboration of the language used in the 
TPNW will be required as States Parties move to implement international cooperation and 
assistance obligations. 
6. The scope of the prohibition against ͞assisting, encouraging, or inducing͟  
This article 1 prohibition is particularly pertinent for NATO members and other States 
operating alongside nuclear-armed States in joint military missions with interoperable 
forces. A maximal interpretation of the dWEt ?Ɛprohibitions to  “ĂƐƐŝƐƚ ?encourage, and 
inducĞ ? could include all military activities with NATO as an explicitly nuclear-armed alliance 
committed to nuclear deterrence and the possible use of nuclear weapons. The inclusion of 
 “threaten to use ? in article 1(d) could be seen as prohibiting an extended nuclear deterrence 
relationship between a non-nuclear-armed State Party to the TPNW and a nuclear-armed 
State outside the treaty. Such an interpretation would present non-nuclear-armed NATO 
States with the choice of acceding to the TPNW or retaining existing military cooperation 
agreements and practices with nuclear-armed States outside the treaty.22 
Alternatively, the ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ  “ĂƐƐŝƐƚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞTPNW could be interpreted minimally as 
prohibiting only those specific activities that deliberately enable the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons. This would allow non-nuclear-armed NATO members to maintain existing military 
cooperation agreements and practices with nuclear-armed States that remain outside the 
treaty, subject to specific changes relating to nuclear weapons. Which political and military 
activities might fall under a more minimal interpretation is open to question. However, 
NATO members have a range of views and practices on nuclear weapon-related activities to 
which the alliance has adapted.23 Accession to the TPNW by one or more of its members 
could signal a phase of further adaptation rather than a binary either/or choice, noting that 
the North Atlantic Treaty itself says nothing about nuclear weapons. 
Three issues in this regard were subject to widespread discussion during the negotiations on 
which no general agreement was reached: military preparations for use, transit, and 
financing. Some States might decide to explicitly recognize these prohibitions in national 
ratification legislation and advocate for others to do the same rather than assuming (or 
                                                        
20  See Working Paper submitted by Pace University, A/CONF.229/2017/NGO/WP.36, 13 June 2017. 
21  See Working Paper submitted by Article 36, A/CONF.229/2017/NGO/WP.10, 27 March 2017.   
22  : ?ŽƌƌŝĞĞƚĂů ? ? “WƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŽĨEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐ P'ƵŝĚĞƚŽƚŚĞ/ƐƐƵĞƐ ? ?/>W/ ?hE//Z ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
p. 37, http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/a-prohibition-on-nuclear-weapons-a-guide-to-the-
issues-en-647.pdf. 
23  ^ĞĞd ?^ĂƵĞƌ ? “,ŽǁǁŝůůEdK ?Ɛ Non-EƵĐůĞĂƌDĞŵďĞƌƐ,ĂŶĚůĞƚŚĞhE ?ƐĂŶŽŶEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐ ? ? ?
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73(3), 2017, pp. 177 W181. 
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denying) their inclusion under the general prohibition against assisting, encouraging, or 
inducing prohibited activities. 
Concluding remarks 
The dWEt ?ƐĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ milestone in efforts to delegitimize nuclear 
weapons. Such is the central role that nuclear weapons play in international security politics 
that, until now, prohibition at the global level was not in prospect, despite well-established 
treaty regimes banning other weapons of mass destruction. Born of humanitarian concern 
and frustration with slow progress of nuclear disarmament, the TPNW fills an important 
 “ůĞŐĂů ŐĂƉ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ, illuminating and augmenting the obligations of 
article VI of the NPT. Now that the gap is filled, the test for the regime it embodies will be 
how it affects the behaviour of those States that rely on nuclear weapons for their security, 
with a view to encouraging them to transition towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. 
The pace of progress towards entry into force is an important initial barometer for the 
TPNW, and one that will be the focus now for TPNW supporters. Yet it is not too early for 
supporter States to commence implementation groundwork. Article 8 invests Meetings of 
States Parties with decisions on matters of implementation after entry into force, and some 
matters, like the issues outlined above, will need careful reflection. Further, as this paper 
has explained, engagement with those States for which joining the TPNW is an unlikely 
prospect for now will be vital. Its character will have implications not just for the TPNW but 
for the broader nuclear weapons control regime, including the NPT, and any future steps 
leading to the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.  
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Abbreviations 
AP  Additional Protocol 
CSA comprehensive safeguards agreement 
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICAN International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
OEWG Open-ended Working Group 
TPNW Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
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